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LAW SCHOOL 
Less than eight years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court 
began its explorations of the links between psychiatric 
testimony, the right to counsel, and the applicability 
of the doctrine in Miranda v. Arizona to cases in-
volving mentally disabled individuals. See generally 
Perlin, "The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled 
Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random 
Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or 'Doctrinal 
Abyss?,'" 29 Ai:iz. L. Rev. 1 (1987) (hereinafter 
"Symbolic Values"). Beginning with its decision in 
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the Court has 
taken up at least a dozen cases involving mentally 
disabled criminal defendants, mostly in contexts in-
volving the role and weight of expert testimony (e.g., 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Jones v. 
U.S., 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 
U.S. 68 (1985)), the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, focusing on the interplay between Miranda and 
mental disability (e.g., Estelle v. Smith; Wainwright 
v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986); Allen v. Illinois, 
478 U.S. 364 (1986); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 
106 S. Ct. 2678 (1986); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 
157 (1987)); and competence to be executed (Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Penry v. Lynaugh, 
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988)). 
For a complex combination of reasons, see "Sym-
bolic Values," supra at 3, the Court has remained 
irresistibly drawn to these issues. Even more recently, 
it has decided two additional cases-Buchanan v. 
Kentucky, 483 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987); and 
Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1792 
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Search and Seizure Law Report 
( 1988 )-both of which deal with prosecutorial use at 
trial or sentencing of statements made by criminal 
defendants to psychiatrists while institutionalized, 
and which, when read together help clarify how se-
riously the Rehnquist Court takes the 1981 Estelle 
decision, and what its significant values are in cases 
involving putatively mentally disabled criminal de-
fendants. 
Baclcground: Estelle v. Smith 
In Estelle, the Supreme Court reversed a death 
sentence that seemed to flow from expert testimony 
by the now well-known Dr. Grigson that the defend-
ant was a "remorse[less]" and a "very severe socio-
path." Estelle, 45 l U.S. at 459-60. Dr. Grigson's 
opinion followed an evaluation of the defendant 
(made at the court's request) about which defense 
counsel had "inexplicably" never been notified. Smith 
v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647, 651 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 
602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 451 U.S. 454 
(1981). 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court found both a 
Fifth Amendment Miranda violation (finding the 
privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the 
penalty phase of a death case, and holding that a 
defendant-who.. neither initiated a psychiatric ex-
amination nor attempted to introduce any psychiatric 
evidence-may not be compelled to respond to a psy-
chiatrist if his statements could be used against him 
at a capital sentencing proceeding), Estelle, 451 U.S. 
at 461-68, and a Sixth Amendment violation_ as well 
(ruling that the defendant's right to counsel was vi-
olated by the state's failure tQ notify the defendant's 
lawyer of the pretrial psychiatric evaluation), id. at 
469-72. 
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Estelle wa~ hailed by scholars and commentators 
as a "fertile source of criminal defense litigation," 
and as a recognition that psychiatrists may not nec-
~ssarily have a "benevolent purpose" in cases where 
such mental health professionals become an "arm of 
t~e prosecutor." Note, 10 Amer. J. Crim. L. 65, 78 
( 1982 ); Note, "Estelle v. Smith and Psychiatric Tes-
timony: New Limits on Predicting Future Danger-
ousness," 33 Baylor L. Rev. 1015, 1033 (1981); Note, 
"The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Psychiatric 
ExaminatjQ11s: Implications of Estelle v. Smith, " 50 
~--de():,-:wa~h. i. ~~v. 275, 303 (1982). 
1foterestingly, however, it was generally construed 
fairlj;nwrq"!lY.;i!.1 ~ater lower federal court cases, and 
was ofohnguished in c;as1s where defendants had 
sop,ght, cq01ppe11.ry /~X'?miqations, where they raised 
~nfahrlltyfdgtiJ.ses~."ano='in-a'civil case where a prison 
adjustment committee imposed disciplinary sanctions 
on a prisoner for his refusal to participate in a screen-
ing interview with a psychologist. See, e.g., Shelby v. 
Shu/sen, 600 F. Supp. 432, 435-36 (D. Utah 1984) 
(competency evaluation; Estelle distinguished); (but 
see Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (9th 
Cir. 1986)(competency examination "critical stage" 
under Estelle)); Sturgis, 796 F.2d at 108 (insanity 
defense; Es_telle distinguished); Watters v. Hubbard, 
72U'.2d 381, 384 (6th Cir. 1984) (accord); U.S. v. 
Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1109-11 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(~calia, J.)(accord); (but see id. at 1137, 1147-50 (Ba-
. zel~n, ,J., dissenting)); Taylor v. Best, 746 F:2d 220, 
24~-24 (4th Cir. 1984) (screening' interview; Estelle 
distinguish~d ). Such decisions appeared to bear out 
Professor Slobogin's cautious concern over what he 
had predicted would be Estelle's "limited applicabil-
ity." Slobogin, "Estelle v. Smith: The Constitutional 
~ontour~ of the Forensic Evaluation," 31 Emory L.J. 
71, 76 ( 1982); see generally "Symbolic Values," supra 
at 6~-64. The decisiop still remained, however, "the 
Burger Court's· highwater Miranda mark." Id. at 80. 
After it handed down Estelle, the Supreme Court 
remained largely silent for the next six years as to the 
potential future contours of its doctrine. Then it de-
cided, within a year, Buchanan and Satterwhite, in an 
attempt to answer two of the many unanswered s.ub-
~tantive and procedural questions left in Estelle's after-
math: whether, when defense counsel seeks an 
evaluation for the· purposes of pretrial treatment, a 
statement to ~ii examining psychiatrist can be used 
at trial on issues of dangerousness or to rebut a mental 
status defense, and, when there is an Estelle violation, 
whether the "harmless eqor" doctrine applies? 
Buchanan v. Kentucky 
In Buchanan, the defendant, in a non-capital hom-
icide trial, had attempted to establish an affirmative 
74 
defense of "extreme emotional disturbance" by hav-
ing a social worker read .from psychological evalua-
tions that had been prepared following earlier, 
unrelated juvenile arrests. According to reports, de-
fendant was an "isolated '[individual], mistrustful of 
others and interpersonally deficient," displaying "fiat 
affect" and a "mild thought disorder," exhibiting 
"extremely simplistic and very concrete thinking" 
and "very ·poor" impulse controls, and appearing to 
_ be "a very dependent, immature, probably pretty se-
verely emotionally disturbed, and very easily confused 
youth," with the "potential for developing a full 
blown schizophrenic disorder," id. at 2910-11 n.9. 
On.cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to 
rebut this defense by having the witness read from 
another evaluation prepared by another mental health 
professional (Dr. Lange) following a joint motion by 
counsel to seek a determination as to whether the 
defendant should appropriately receive psychiatric 
treatment while awaiting trial in the current proceed-
ings. Id. at 2911. According to Dr. Lange, the de-
fendant was a "fairly sophisticated youth who would 
be capable of manipulative conning type behaviors." 
Id. n.10. 
The court noted that, while Dr. Lange also ex-
pressed his views on the defendant's competency to 
stand trial, that was not the purpose· of liis evaluation; 
rat~er, the motion was filed "to enable [the] defend-
ant to receive psychiatric treatment." Id. n.11. 
When defense counsel objected that this evaluation 
had nothing to do with his emotional disturbance 
defense (but only with his competency to stand trial, 
an issue defendant had never raised), id. at 2911-12, 
the court allowed an edited version to be read to the 
jury, reasoning, "You can't argue about his mental 
status at the time of the commitment of this offense 
and exclude evidence when he was evaluated with 
reference to that mental status," id. at 2912. 
After the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the 
defendant's non-capital conviction (on the theory that 
he had "opened the door" to the introduction of Dr. 
Lange's report by introducing the earlier reports, Bu-
chanan v. Commonwealth, 691S.W.2d210, 213 (Ky. 
1985), and that the use of the report did not violate 
the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Smith}, the 
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. 
First, Justice Blackmun, writing for a six-Justice 
majority, distinguished Estelle, since, in that case, t~e 
defendant had neither raised a mental state defense 
nor offered psychiatric evidence at trial. Buchanan, 
107 S. Ct. at 2917, discussing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 465-
66. Here, since the defendant requested a psychiatric 
evaluation and presented some psychiatric evidence 
(on the issue of an extreme emotional disturbance 
defense), "at the very least, the prosecution may rebut 
this presentation with the reports of the examination 
that the defendant requested. " Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. 
at 2918. 
Under such circumstances, the Fifth Amendment 
would not apply. Id., citing, inter alia, Byers, 740 
F.2d at 1111-13. Estelle was further distinguishable 
since ( 1) Buchanan's lawyer joined in the motion for 
Dr. Lange's examination, and (2) the "entire defense 
strategy" was to establish the defendant's "extreme 
emotional disturbance. " Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 
2918. 
Second, the Court further rejected the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment Estelle argument; since defense 
counsel requested Dr. Lange's examination, "It can 
be assumed-and there are no allegations to the con-
trary-that defense counsel consulted with the [de-
fendant] about the nature of the examination." Id. 
See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469-71. It similarly rejected 
defendant's argument that he could not have antici-
pated that the requested evaluation might be used to 
undermine his "mental status" defense; under Estelle, 
the Court reasoned, counsel was "certainly on notice 
that if . . . he intended to put on a 'mental status' 
defense ... , he would have to anticipate the use of 
psychological evidence by the prosecution in rebut-
tal." Buchanan: 107 S. Ct. at 2919. 
The Court finally concluded that, if there were any 
constitutional error,.it was "harmless in the circum-
stances of this case," id. n.21, since defendant had 
failed, under Kentucky law, to show provocation, an 
additional element of the extreme emotional distur-
bance defense, independent of defendant's mental sta-
tus, id. 
Justice Marshall's dissent (on this issue, for himself 
and Justice Brennan; Justice Stevens joined the dissent 
on an unrelated issue) focused on the "fundamental 
distinction" between an examination for the purposes 
of assessing defendant's then-current amenability to 
involuntary hospitalization and treatment, and one 
for assessing his prior m~ntal condition at the time 
of the offense. Id. at 2919, 2922 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). The examination request stemmed from 
"humanitarian and therapeutic concerns unrelated to 
the prosecution," id. at 2923, and these concerns could 
only be satisfied if there were "unimpeded establish-
ment of relations of trust and cooperation among the 
physician, the [state], and the potential patient," id. 
He added: 
These concerns apply with full force to the men-
tally ill criminal defendant, and in this context require 
the trus~ and cooperation of the
1 
defendant's attorney 
as well. If the purposes of the mvoluntary hospital-
ization and treatment provisions are to be attained, 
and examinations are to be accurate and treatments 
effective, the defendant must feel free to request an 
75 
examination without lingering fears that the content 
of liis discussions with the examiner, or the exam~ 
iner's impressions of his current mental status, will 
be used against him at trial. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
The state would remain free, Justice Marshall 
noted, to seek a separate examination specifically as 
to the defendant's mental condition at the tiPie of the 
offense. Id n.5. He emphasized that there was no 
suggestion here that defendant "exploited" exami-
nation procedures to "manufacture evidence" so as 
to be able to proffer a mental status defense, noting 
that the reports on which the defendant relied had 
been prepared at the state's request before the occur-
rence of the crime for which the defendant was being 
charged. This sequence, in liis view, was suffi.Cient to 
counter any suggestion that the evidence of defend-
ant's emoti~nal disturbance was "a product of self-
serving origin. " Id. 
While it was possible (but unlikely) tpat the state 
intended to offer the defendant the possiDility of pre-
trial hospital treatment only on the condition that.he 
waive objections to the admission of inculpatory state-
ments or impressions made dunng the evaluation, "it 
could not be assumed that either [defendant] or his 
attorney knew of this condition when joining a request 
for the examination." Id. at 2923 (emphasis in orig-
inal). 
Since Estelle did not hold that the contents of any 
report could be admitted as rebuttal evidence on the 
mental status 'issue, defendant's request was "mate-
rially uninformed, as was his consultation with coun-
sel," thus, in Justice Marshall's view, violating the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id. at 2923-24. 
Justice Marshall also specifically rejected what he 
read as the majority's suggestion that, where a de-
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fondant places his mental status in issue by relying 
on reports that do not address his trial competency, 
"he should expect that the results of his competency 
examination may be used by the prosecutor in re-
buttal." Id. at 2924 n.6. Such an expectation would 
be contrary to "the integrity of the clinical endeavor 
[which] requires the creation and maintenance of re-
lations among the prosecution, defense, examiner, and 
defendant that are as open and cooperative as pos-
sible." Id. 
Satterwhite v. Texas 
In an even more recent case, the Court was faced 
with a fact situation much closer to the one in Estelle, 
and one that involved the same witness, Dr. James 
P. Grigson. In Satterwhite, after the defendant was 
charged with a capital murder offense (but before 
. indictment or the appointment of counsel), the state 
requested (and was granted) a psychological evalu-
ation (by Dr. Schroeder, a psychologist) as to the 
defendant's competency to stand trial, his responsi-
bility at the time of the offense and his future dan-
gernusness. Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1795. 
After indictment and appointment of counsel, the 
state successfully sought a second evaluation (by Dr. 
Holbrook, a psychiatrist) on the same topics; defense 
counsel was not notified of this examination, ei'ther. 
About one month later, Dr. Grigson submitted a letter 
to the ttjal court, reporting that he had evaluated the 
defendant in jail, and that defendant had "a severe 
antisocial personality disorder and [was] extremely 
dangerous and will s;ommit future acts of violence," 
id. at 1795. Remarkably, there was some dispute as 
to exactly what precipitated this evaluation, since the 
record revealed no court order so authorizing Dr. 
Grigson to do such an evaluation. 
The dekndant was convicted of capital murder. 
Satterwhite v. State, 726 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1986). At the penalty phase, Dr. Grigson testified, 
pursuant to Texas law, see Tex. Crim. Proc. Code 
Ann .. § 37.071 ( 1988 Supp.), that the defendant pre-
sented a "continuing threat to society through acts 
of criminal violence," Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1795. 
And the defendant was sentenced to death. 
On direct appeal, while the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals agreed that the admission of Dr. Grigson's 
testimony violated Estelle, it found the error to be 
harmless as an average jury would still have found 
that the appropriately-admitted evidence was a suf-
ficient basis upon which to sentence the defendant to 
death. Satterwhite, 726 S.W.2d at 92-93. The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether the "harmless error" doctrine applied to Es-
telle Sixth Amendment violations, Satterwhite, 108 S. 
76 
Ct. at 1796. See generally Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 24 ( 1967). 
On appeal, Justice 0 'Connor expressed the view of 
a majority on the Court that the admi~ion of Dr. 
Grigson's testimony did violate the Sixth Amend-
ment. Id. at 1797. (Justice Marshall filed a separate 
opinion, concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment, on behalf of himself, Justice Brennan, and, in 
part, Justice Blackmun; Justice Blackmun filed a brief 
opinion, concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment; Justice Kennedy did not participate in the case.) 
Because the defendant was indicted, arraigned and 
had counsel appointed all before Dr. Grigson's ex-
amina,tion, if was "clear" that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsei attached. Id. at 1796-97. 
The majority further rejected the state's argument 
that other motions and orders filed with the Court 
provided defense counsel with sufficient notice that a 
"future dangerousness" examination would take 
place. First, there was an unresolved factual dispute 
as to the applicability and timing of some of the filings 
in question. See id. at 1796, and id. n.2. Second, even 
if all filings had been made in a timely manner, they 
would not have "adequately notif[ ied] " defense coun-
sel as to Dr. Grigson's ensuing examination. Third, 
there was no support for a "constructive notice" the-
ory (based on the placement of the state's motions 
and certain ex parte orders in the file) urged by the 
state. Id. at 1797. 
Moving on to the harmless error issue, the Court 
found that while a Sixth Amendment violation that 
"pervade[ d] the entire proceeding," could "never '·1 
be considered harmless, the effect of this error was 
simply limited to the admission of Dr. Grigson's tes-
timony. Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1797 (citing, inter 
a/ia, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.9; Holloway v. Ar-
kansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1975)). Furthermore, a re-
viewing court would be in a position to "make an 
inteiligent judgment about whether the_ erroneous ad-
mission of psychiatric t~stimony might have affected 
a capital sentencing jury." Id. at 1798. Thus, the 
harmless error doctrine would apply to Estelle-type 
Sixth Amendment' violations. Id. Interestingly, the 
Court noted, on lhis point, that it had applied the 
harmless error doctrine to a psychological evaluation 
question in Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2919 n.21. 
Under the circumstances of this case, however, the 
Court found the error not to be harmless, because the 
state had failed to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained." Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1798, 
quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. Dr. Grigson's tes-
timony "[stood] out," the majority noted, because of 
his qualifications (he was the only "licensed physi-
cian" to take the stand, Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 
----- - - ....... - .,,.. 
1199 ), and the "powerful- content of his message" 
( Grigson had stated "unequivocably" that the de-
fendant would pose a "continuing threat" to society, 
that he had a "lack of conscience," that he was "as 
severe a sociopath as you can be," that on a one-to-
ten scale of sociopathy, he was a "ten plus," and that 
he was "beyond the reach of psychiatric rehabilita-
tion," id. ), a message highlighted by the district at-
torney in his closing argument. See id.: 
[Dr. Grigson] tells you that on a range from 1 to 
10 he's ten plus. Severe sociopath. Extremely dan-
gerous. A continuing threat to society. Can it be 
cured? Well, it's not a disease. It's not an illness. 
That's his personality. That's John T. Satterwhite. 
Grigson's findings were "critical" to the death sen-
tence, and the Court, finding it impossible to say 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony did not 
influence the jury, concluded that the error was thus 
not harmless. Id. 
In a separate opinion, Justice Marshall agreed that 
admission of Dr. Grigson's testimony was a "bald 
violation" of Estelle, and that the defendant's death 
sentence should thus be vacated. Id. at 1799 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment). He wrote separately, however, to stress two 
points: (J) the Court should be "especially hesitant 
to ever apply harmless error analysis to capital cases," 
id., and (2) even if the harmless error doctrine were 
ever appropriate in capital cases generally, it was in-
appropriate in cases showing Sixth Amendment Es-
telle errors. Id. at 1801 (Justice Blackmun joined in 
this aspect of his opinion only). 
First, the Estelle Court "gave no hint" that such 
an analysis could ever apply to the admission of psy-
chiatric testimony in capital sentencing proceedings 
where there was a Sixth Amendment violation, id.; 
The potential prejudice is "so high" where the tes-
timony is generally of "critical importance" to the 
sentencing determination, and where it is "clothed 
with a scientific authority that often carries great 
weight with lay juries." Id. On this point, Justice 
Marshall cited his majority opinion in Ake v. Okla-
homa, 470 U.S. 68, 79 ( 1985), recognizing the "piv-
otal role" psychiatry plays in criminal proceedings. 
Second, Justice Marshall found it "difficult, if not 
impossible, to accurately measure the degree of prej-
udice" arising from a failure to notify defense counsel 
in such a case, Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1801 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment): 
Divining the effect of psychiatric testimony on a 
sentencer's determination whether death is an ap-
propriate sentence is thus more in the province of 
soothsayers than appellate judges. 
77 
Id. at 1802. 
Because of the "confluence" of factors-likelihood 
of prejudice, difficulty in assessing degree or'prejudice, 
and heightened concern for reliability in capital 
cases-he was thus convinced that admission in vi-
olation of Estelle of a psychiatric examination that 
leads to testimony at a capital sentencing "may never 
be considered harmless error." Id. at 1802-03. 
He further found the Court's reliance on Buchanan 
unpersuasive. As Buchanan was prosecuted.for a non-
capital offense, any indication in that opinion that the 
harmless error doctrine might apply in illegal admis-
sion of psychological testimony cases thus had "little 
relevance in the present context." Id. at 1803 n.3. 
Justice Blackmun wrote separately, both to indicate 
his agreement with Justice Marshall that harmless 
error analysis was inappropriate in an Estelle Sixth 
Amendment context, and to note that the problem 
with which the Court was faced was "particularly 
acute where, under a system such as that of Texas, 
the jury must answer the very question the psychia-
trist purports to answer." Id. at 1803 (Blackmuii, i., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
He concluded: 
I am fortified in this conclusion by my continuing 
concern-wholly apart from the testimony of the ubiq-
uitous Doctor Grigson in Texas capital cases - about 
the reliability of psychiatric testimony as to a de-
fendant's future dangerousness (wrong two times out 
of three). See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 
(1983) (dissenting opinion). 
Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1803 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment) (em-
phasis added). 
Impact of Buchanan and Satterwh'ite? 
When read together, Buchanan and Satterwhite re-
veal some backsliding from the Estelle position, but 
also appear to clarify that the Rehnquist Court is not 
ready to abandon that doctrine in toto. 
The Estelle violation in Satterwhite was a cle_ar one; 
the Court's opinion needs to be read more as a re-
flection of its post-Barefoot desire to treat death pen-
alty cases procedurally more like non-capital cases 
than as a separate category. See "Symboijc Values," 
supra at 4 (discussing Supreme Court's "obsessiveness 
with narrowing the universe of potential new issues 
which could be raised in death penalty appeals") 
(emphasis in original). 
While the Satterwhite majority suggests that a re-
viewing court can make an "intelligent judgment" as 
to whether inappropriately admitted testimony un-
constitutionally taints a subsequent verdict, it does 
not respond directly to Justice Marshall's fears that 
the patina of scientific authority given to such testi-
_ _J 
mony may carry dispositive weight with lay jurors, 
Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1798. Interestingly, the ma-
jority does focus on the stature of Dr. Grigson's cre-
dentials ("the only licensed physician to take the 
stand"). Id. at 1799. See also id.: "He informed the 
jury of his educational background and- experience, 
which included teaching psychiatry at a Dallas med-
ical school and practicing psychiatry for over 12 
years." 
On the other hand, the Buchanan opinion is more 
problematic for at least two separate reasons. First, 
it appears to indicate that the Supreme Court is as 
confused as others as to the different types of potential 
mental status examinations, and the significant tem-
poral differences in these evaluations. See Buchanan, 
107 S. Ct. at 2919, 2922 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
While defense counsel did join in the request for Dr. 
Lange's examination, it appears clear that this was 
conceived of as a means of seeking pretrial hospital-
ization for his client, not as an attempt to "sandbag" 
the state (by creating "self-serving" testimony as to 
his history of "extreme emotional disturbance"). Id. 
at 2919, 2923 n:5 EMarshall, J., dissenting); compare 
id. at 2919 n.21 (defendant argued to Supreme Court 
that affirmance might cause future defense counsel to 
"sandbag" the court by wait!ng until after trial to 
raise the competency to stand trial question) (major-
ity opinion). 
This leads to a more troubling inquiry: has the 
Supreme Court created yet another "incredible di-
lemma" for mentally disabled defendants? See Perlin, 
"Another 'Incredible Dilemma': Psychiatric Assist-
ance and Self-Incrimination," [ 1985-86] ABA Pre-
view, No. 10 (March 14, 1986); see generally Smith 
v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 106 S. Ct. 2678 (1986). If 
they are to exercise their statutory right to seek hos-
pital treatment awaiting trial, are they sacrificing their 
right to coun~el and their privilege against self-in-
crimination in the ensuing criminal trial? See, e.g., 
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 202A.070(5) ( 1977), discussed in 
Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2911 n.11. While this concern 
is raised in Justice Marshall's dissent, id. at 2923, it 
is not squarely dealt with in the majority opinion. 
Thus, the majority suggests that, given its opinion in 
Estelle, counsel was "certainly on notice" that if he 
intended to raise a "mental status" defense, he would 
have to anticipate testimonial rebuttal. Id. at 2919. 
SUPREME COURT LINEUP 
Certiorari Denied 
The Supreme Court denied review in the following 
cases: . 
• Effective assistance. Will a defense attorney's re-
jection of an alibi defense strategy before talking to 
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While that suggestion certainly does comport w~th 
Smith as to the mental status defense, it is not on 
point on the question of ameliorative pretrial hospi-
talization, which the majority conceded was the pur-
pose of defense counsel's motion. Id. at 2911 n.11. 
This issue is largely independent of the Estelle con-
cerns (and is irrelevant to the fact pattern in Satter-
white where counsel had never received notice of the 
examination at all). Yet, it remains an important one. 
If counsel respond to Buchanan by advising clients 
not to seek such ameliorative treatment (so as to avoid 
the possibility of an over-inclusive examination such 
as the one apparently done by Dr. Lange), then the 
state statutory scheme becomes only hortatory. 
Are there other links between Satterwhite and Bu-
chanan? When read together, they should probably 
also be considered in the context of two other Supreme 
Court doctrines: its watered-down "reasonable effec-
tiveness of counsel" standard as enunciated in Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its 
procedural default doctrine set out in Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 ( 1977}. These cases make it fairly 
clear that the Supreme Court will be loath to tamper 
with a jury verdict when the complained-of error ap-
pears to fie, to almost any appreciable extent, the 
result of counsel's decision making. Tfms, it refused 
to reverse in Buchanan (where counsel allegedly 
should have been able to anticipate what might have 
happened once he "opened the door") but did so in 
Satterwhite (where counsel had no way of knowing 
what was transpiring). This gloss gives life to two 
Supreme Court policies: not inquiring into counsel 
competency, but also not sanctioning abusive use of 
mental health testimony by the state in the crimillal 
process (as reflected first in Estelle). 
Conclusion 
While there has not yet been any com~entary or 
significant follow-up litigation on Satterwhite or on 
this aspect of Buchanan, it is likely that both will be 
considered carefully in the future. The two cases show 
that the Supreme Court is still like a moth drawn to 
a flame, fascinated by cases involving mentally dis-
abled criminal defendants. The Court's fascination 
shows no sign o'f ebbing. No doubt cases offering 
further refinement of these issues will emerge in com-
ing Supreme Court Terms. 
all of the individuals whose t~tfmony would support 
defendant's alibi amount to ineffective assistance? 01-
~on_ v. U.S., No. 88-62, seeking review of 846 F.2d 
_1103 (7th Cir. 1988), which refused to question coun- -
sel's choice of defense strategy. 
